The no-reform of the Italian labour market.

Many different and passionate comments have been published in the past weeks about the Italian labour market reform. The topic is for sure very relevant from the economic and political perspective, and it is also a sort of “litmus paper” of the technical ability and political orientation of the Professor Monti Government.
There is a clear and strong idea underpinning the labour market reform proposed by the government: the extension of the rights to somebody must be associated with a reduction of the rights of somebody else, a sort of exchange between generations, between the elderly and the youngs in the labour market.
In the following comment we leave this idea and its economic robustness at the side, notwithstanding it has relevant political implications. We address our critics to an internal (in)consistency of the proposed reform in three areas: (1) reduction in the misuse of flexible contracts and incentive to subordinate labour contracts; (2) restructuring of the unemployment subsidies; (3) reduction of the firing costs.
We argue that the proposed reform does not provide neither prepare the necessary novelty in the functioning of the Italian labour market, as it does not seem to introduce effective leverages and stimula to favour the expected and widely asked growth path for the economy. With the proposed reform there is the serious risk to maintain the existing labour market, with probably increased costs for firms and without expanding opportunities for job growth.